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ARGUMENT 
I. Mr. Murdock's Death Was Accidental 
Utah courts follow the rule that an "accident" is an event that is not "naturally and 
probably expected" by the insured. See Hoffman v. Life Ins. Co. of North Am.. 669 
P.2d 410,415-16 (Utah 1983); Hardv v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co.. 787 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 
App. 1990). As recently as this year, the Utah Supreme Court has reaffirmed that an 
"accident" includes effects "which are not the natural and probable consequences" of 
an act or course of action. Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Constr.. Inc.. 1999 WL 507167 at 3-4 
(Utah 1999). For a result to not be an accident, it must "ordinarily" follow a particular 
course of action, and it must be "more likely to follow" the course of action than not to 
follow it. I d at 4; Hoffman. 669 P.2d at 416. 
Monumental Life Insurance Company (hereinafter "Monumental") also relies on 
Hoffman to stand for the basic proposition that one who participates in an armed attack 
must naturally and probably expect a victim to respond with deadly force. 
Nevertheless, the rules stated in Hoffman are not so broad and absolute as to 
encompass the situation in our case. 
The Hoffman case does indicate that "if the insured threatens to kill, or inflict 
serious bodily injury on, another person or assaults another person under 
circumstances making it likelv the other person will respond with deadly force, and does 
so and kills the insured, the insured's death is not accidental." Hoffman. 669 P.2d at 
417 (emphasis added). Even so, this rule is merely a natural corollary of the general 
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rule that events that should be naturally and probably expected by the insured to occur 
are not accidents. 
Nevertheless, the facts and circumstances of this case are easily distinguished 
from those described in Hoffman or the other five cases cited by Monumental. This is 
especially true when the facts and inferences are viewed in Mrs. Murdochs favor, as 
they should be. The Hoffman court also indicated that "the simple fact that an insured 
is armed during a confrontation does not, by itself, make the insured's death 
nonaccidental." \A. Indeed, that court refused to conclude that insured's death was 
nonaccidental in part because there was conflicting evidence as to whether the insured 
specifically threatened the lives of the police officers who shot him even though he was 
clearly holding a gun at the time. \JL at 418. 
Only where the insured's conduct "threatens death or serious bodily injury to 
another,... should [the insured] expect or anticipate that the threatened individual will 
very likely respond with deadly force." \JL (emphasis added). In other words, the threat 
must be present and ongoing, giving rise to the likelihood that the "threatened" party will 
respond in a manner intended to harm or kill the insured in an effort to repel or 
terminate the threat. 
Indeed, these are the very same conditions described in most of the other cases 
relied upon by Monumental. See, e.g.. Isoard v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. 22 F.2d 956 (8th 
Cir. 1927) (armed insured is shot by the person he was threatening to shoot); Valley 
Dental Assoc, v. Great West Life. 842 P.2d 1340 (Ariz. App. 1992) (armed insured is 
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stabbed to death by the person he is raping); Carlyle v. Equity Benefit Life Ins. Co.. 551 
P.2d 663 (Okla. 1976) (armed insured killed while attempting to complete the crime). 
Unlike the situation described in Hoffman or these other cases, the threat of 
death or serious bodily injury to Mr. Moser had ended. Mr. Moser was no longer 
"threatened" once Mr. Murdock and his accomplice were fleeing the scene. Moreover, 
no evidence suggests that Mr. Moser was attempting to repel or terminate a threat of 
death or serious bodily injury when he drove the vehicle over Mr. Murdock. Finally, and 
most significantly, Mr. Moser asserted that he did not intend to drive the vehicle into or 
over Mr. Murdock and did not realize he had done so until well after the fact. This is not 
even a case of an angry victim attempting to retaliate with deadly force. 
Moreover, the fact that Mr. Moser pursued the robbers in a vehicle in an effort to 
retrieve the stolen funds likely had nothing to do with whether the perpetrators had just 
committed an armed attack. In fact, it would seem just as likely, if not more so, that a 
victim might attempt to pursue a thief in a vehicle in a situation where the thief simply 
grabbed the money and ran away. 
Accordingly, Monumental^ analysis of the Hoffman case and its attempt to 
stretch the language of that case to the present one must fail. Mr. Moser admittedly did 
not intend death or serious bodily injury to Mr. Murdock as he made his pursuit. 
Certainly based on the circumstances, and all reasonable inferrences, Mr. Murdock 
could not have naturally and probably expected that he would be killed by being 
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unintentionally run over by a vehicle driven through a field full of debris. Mr. Murdochs 
death was an accident. 
II. The Exclusion in Question Does Not Preclude Coverage 
Monumental bears the burden of establishing the applicability of the "assault or 
felony" exclusion contained in the policy in question. See LPS Hosp. v. Capitol Life Ins. 
Co.. 765 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1988). This is not necessarily an easy burden to meet, 
and Monumental failed to meet this burden in its motion for summary judgment. 
"It must not be forgotten that the purpose of insurance is to insure . . . . " kL 
Accordingly, "insurance policies should be construed liberally in favor of the insured and 
their beneficiaries so as to promote and not defeat the purposes of insurance." U.S. 
Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Sandt. 854 P.2d 519, 521 (Utah 1993). Indeed, "the insured is 
entitled to the broadest coverage he could reasonably understand from the policy." \JL 
at 522. 
Insurers such as Monumental may exclude certain losses from coverage only "by 
using language which clearly and unmistakenly communicates to the insured the 
specific circumstances under which the expected coverage will not be provided." Utah 
Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Crook. 980 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1999). Accordingly, 
"provisions that limit or exclude coverage should be strictly construed against the 
insurer," and any "ambiguous or uncertain language in an insurance contract that is 
fairly susceptible to different interpretations should be construed in favor of coverage." 
Sandt. 854 P.2d at 522-23. 
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These fundamental rules are applied regularly to an insurance contract because 
it is "a classic example of an adhesion contract." 14 at 522. 
Insurance contracts are typically drafted by insurance company 
attorneys who are duty-bound to protect their clients. The terms of a 
typical insurance policy are not negotiated by the insurer and the insured. 
A policy is usually offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. . . . "Normally, the 
details and provisions of the policy are not discussed, . . . [and] many of 
its terms and all of its defenses and super-refinements [the insured] has 
never heard of and would not understand them if he read them." 
IdL (quoting Browning v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. 72 P.2d 1060, 1073 (Utah 1937)). 
Nor should it be forgotten that money has been paid for the insurance policy-money 
that will be forfeited if the contract is nullified—and that no wrongdoing has even been 
alleged on the part of the policy's intended beneficiary. 
A. Mr. Murdock's death did not result from "committing an assault or felony". 
The fact that Mr. Murdock may have committed an assault or a felony in the 
events preceding his death does not, as a matter of law, bring his death within 
Monumental's "assault or felony" exclusion as Monumental seems to believe. Nor has 
Monumental established, as a matter of law, the required causal relationship between 
Mr. Murdock's death and his prior conduct. See LPS Hosp.. 765 P.2d at 860. 
The exclusion in question in this case employs language excluding "a loss which 
is caused by, resulting from, or contributed to by" some defined conduct or occurrence. 
Monumental suggests that this Court should adopt the reasoning of National Farmers 
Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Western Cas. Ins. Co.. 577 P.2d 961 (Utah 1978), which 
held that the phrase "arising out o f is a phrase of broader significance than "caused 
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by", and that the language requires only that there be some causal relationship 
between the injury and the risk for which coverage is provided. \cL at 962-63. 
Nevertheless, the holding in National Farmers Union involved an exclusion in a 
homeowners insurance policy, making the holding dicta with respect to an accidental 
death policy. Moreover, the courts recently relying on the holding have been construing 
the term "arising out o f to uphold coverage under an insurance contract, not to 
terminate coverage. See, e.g.. Gibbs M. Smith. Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co.. 949 
P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997); Viking Ins. Co. of Wise, v. Coleman. 927 P.2d 661, 663-64 
(Utah App. 1996) (indicating that the "term 'arising out of should be broadly interpreted 
in favor of coverage"). Such an approach seems consistent with the principle of 
construing an insurance contract to provide the broadest coverage reasonable. See 
Sandt. 854 P.2d at 522. 
More importantly, the exclusion involved in this case does not even employ the 
term "arising out of , so the discussion seems largely irrelevant. In any event, the Utah 
Supreme Court still requires a necessary causal relationship between the injury and the 
excluded conduct or occurrence even when broad language is used. See LPS Hosp.. 
765 P.2d at 860. Indeed, the exclusion in LPS Hospital included an exclusion from 
coverage for a loss "arising out of an attempt at assault or felony." \± at 859 (emphasis 
added). Even so, the Supreme Court still required that "the insured must have been 
actually engaged in a felony at the time and place of the injury" in order for the 
exclusion to apply. \JL at 860 (emphasis added). 
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The same principles of causation are required here. Viewing the facts and all 
reasonable inferences in favor of Mrs. Murdock, and construing the exclusion in favor of 
the broadest reasonable coverage, this Court must conclude that Mr. Murdock was not 
engaged in a felony or assault "at the time and place" of his death. The fact that there 
may be some causal link is insufficient to nullify the provisions of an insurance contract 
as LPS Hospital illustrates. 
Again, it must be emphasized that a victim who has had a hundred-dollar bill 
stolen might attempt to chase the thief in a vehicle even though no assault or felony 
was ever committed. Mr. Moser was not intending to use deadly force in an effort to 
cause serious injury or death to Mr. Murdock; he was simply trying to retrieve the 
money. This result may have followed any theft. It is not so closely and logically 
connected to "an assault or felony" to satisfy the necessary causal relationship. 
Moreover, the exclusion itself uses the term "committing" (rather than 
"committed" or "commission"), a term which plainly refers to current and ongoing 
conduct, not conduct past or already completed. Accordingly, the reasoning of LPS 
Hospital should be adopted and the Court should conclude that, as a matter of law (or 
at least for purposes of Monumental's motion for summary judgment), Mr. Murdock was 
not "committing an assault or felony" at the "time and place" the vehicle driven by Mr. 
Moser accidently collided with him. 
Such a conclusion is necessary if the exclusion is to be "strictly construed 
against the insurer" as is required under Utah law. Sandt. 854 P.2d at 523. 
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Monumental complains that Mrs. Murdock should not be allowed to nullify "the 
exclusion." (Appellee's Brief at 12). However, the more important policy is that the 
"insurance contract" should not be nullified, especially in light of a poorly drafted 
exclusion contained in a contract of adhesion. Indeed, Utah courts favor "a liberal 
construction in favor of the insured to accomplish the purpose for which the insurance 
was taken out and for which the premium was paid." l i at 522 (quoting Browning. 72 
P.2dat1073). 
Accordingly, the trial court erred by concluding that Monumental's "assault or 
felony" exclusion precludes coverage as a matter of undisputed fact and law in this 
case.1 
B. Monumental's exclusion is ambiguous and must be 
construed in favor of coverage. 
The insured party is entitled to "the broadest protection he could reasonably 
believe the commonly understood meaning of its terms afforded him." Sandt. 854 P.2d 
at 522. Accordingly, "an insurer wishing to limit coverage through an exclusion must 
employ language clearly identifying the scope of the limitation." Draughon v. CUNA 
Mut. Ins. Soc. 771 P.2d 1105,1108 (Utah App. 1989) (emphasis added). An insurer 
that fails to do this will not be able to exclude coverage. "[A]mbiguous or uncertain 
1
 Monumental inexplicably attempts to distinguish some cases not even cited by Mrs. 
Murdock in her initial brief. (Appellee's Brief at 13). Discussion of those cases is not 
relevant to this appeal. It should be noted, however, that Monumental distinguishes the 
facts, but not the logic, reasoning and legal principles established in Denies v. First 
National Life Ins. Co.. 144 So.2d 570 (La. App. 1962). As analyzed in Mrs. Murdock's 
initial brief, that case has great significance to the rationale to be applied in this case. 
language in an insurance contract that is fairly susceptible to different interpretations 
should be construed in favor of coverage." Sandt. 854 P.2d at 522. 
Such is the case with Monumental's exclusion. It is not clear whether 
"committing an assault or felony" refers to conduct of the insured or of a third party. 
"Whether an insurance policy is ambiguous is a question of law. A policy may be 
ambiguous if it is unclear, omits terms, or is capable of two or more plausible 
meanings." S.W. Energy Corp. v. Continental Ins. Co.. 974 P.2d 1239. If a contract is 
ambiguous, contrary to Monumental's assertion, "it is appropriate to simply construe 
ambiguities against insurers, without pausing to consider extrinsic evidence of intent, 
since the parties to routine kinds of insurance contracts typically do not discuss or 
negotiate terms and provisions." Metropolitan Prop. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Finlayson. 751 
P.2d 254, 257 n.3 (Utah App. 1988). 
Monumental's exclusion does not explicitly state whether it refers to conduct (1) 
of the insured, (2) of some third party, or (3) of any party, including the insured. 
Monumental argues that the policy exception for committing an assault or felony 
"applies to the insured and not to third parties." (Appellee's Brief at 11). On the other 
hand, the trial court concluded that the exclusion's "plain meaning" was that 
Monumental "will not pay benefits for a loss which is caused by, that results from, or 
contributed by persons committing an assault or felony. That means anybody can 
commit an assault or felony and they won't pay on the insured's case." (R. 160, T. 9 
(emphasis added)). 
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The difference in the interpretations applied to the exclusion's "plain language" 
by the insurance company and the trial court emphasize the confusion and ambiguity. 
If the insurance company's attorney and the trial judge cannot agree on the 
interpretation, the average policy purchaser will not be able to understand the 
exclusion. 
Inasmuch as the listed exclusions do refer to some acts by third parties, such as 
the act of "undeclared war", Mr. Murdock could reasonably have understood the policy 
to refer to the assaults and felonies of third persons as well. While this interpretation is 
not the most plausible, it is one plausible interpretation, and in light of the policy's lack 
of clarity, the exclusion must be construed in favor of coverage. That is the principle 
gleaned from LPS Hospital, that an unclear exclusion will be construed in favor of 
coverage, even if the result may not seem logical or what the insurance company 
intended. 765 P.2d at 860-61. 
Similarly, Mr. Murdock could reasonably have understood the exclusion to apply 
only when his death occurred while "committing" an assault or felony. Inasmuch as Mr. 
Murdock was no longer "committing" any assault or felony at the time of his accidental 
death, he likely would have believed that his death was covered under the policy. 
Monumental argues that LPS Hospital did not consider a lack of reference to 
whose conduct is excluded to give rise to an ambiguity. Nevertheless, the holding in 
LPS Hospital certainly cannot be contorted to include such a proposition. The Supreme 
Court never considered the issue, likely because it was never raised by the parties. 
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Moreover, we do not have the complete policy in our possession to compare to 
Monumental's. LPS Hospital does not support Monumental's case. 
Finally, Monumental claims it must prevail because Mrs. Murdock has not cited 
one case directly supporting the ambiguity argument. Mrs. Murdock would simply note 
that Monumental has not cited one case that directly refutes the ambiguity argument. 
The policy exclusion is capable of more than one plausible interpretation, and must be 
construed in favor of coverage. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
On the basis of all arguments and analysis set forth in the briefs, the Court of 
Appeals should reverse the trial court and set aside the summary judgment entered in 
favor of Monumental. Clearly Mr. Murdock's death was not intended, not likely and not 
the natural result of fleeing a crime scene. Indeed, the event could be considered 
extraordinary. Accordingly, Mr. Murdock's death was accidental and outside the 
boundaries of time and place of any assault or felony. 
The Court of Appeals should further conclude as a matter of law that Mr. 
Murdock's accidental death was not sufficiently connected to "committing an assault or 
felony" and that Monumental's exclusion is ambiguous in any event. 
In the alternative, the Court of Appeals should view the facts and inferences in 
favor of Mrs. Murdock, conclude that genuine issues of material fact remain to be 
resolved as set forth in Mrs. Murdock's briefs, and remand the case for trial on those 
issues. Mrs. Murdock is entitled to at least be able to fully present her case in court. 
DATED this day of November, 1999. 
'ERIC NELSON 
"GAMES K. HASLAM 
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